Democracy, Demagogues and Dysfunction

Politics

Democracy, Demagogues and Dysfunction

Kollin Fields24 min read

Democracy, Demagogues, and Dysfunction

Kollin E. Fields

In democracies, ordinary citizens see a man emerging from their ranks and possessing, after a few years, wealth and power; the sight of this arouses their astonishment and envy; they wonder how their equal of yesterday is today invested with the right to be their ruler. 

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America


Philosophers often differentiate goods by their intrinsic or instrumental value. An intrinsic good is something whose worth or value terminates in the thing itself. We might call this thing good “for its own sake.” For instance, I carry a toy fish in my work bag every day that my daughter squirreled away some years ago. It’s intrinsically valuable only to me, and its value begins and ends in the thing itself; it is not a means to some other good. Instrumental goods, on the other hand, are valued for the way they enable something else. They are a means to an end, hence the root word instrument, like a tool. My work bag has instrumental value because of what it holds and allows me to do each day. Of course, some goods can be both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. My laptop, for example, may have intrinsic worth as I think about the company it’s provided at various libraries and coffee shops throughout the years; it also has instrumental value as a required tool for work: It permits me to do something else with it, such as writing this essay. 


With this in mind we ask, what kind of “good” is democracy? And what do we make of those Americans throughout history who believed it’s no good at all? 


A Brief History of an Idea


In order to answer these questions we first have to define democracy itself, which is not as easy as it may seem. In Athens, the “birthplace of democracy,” the word demokratia connoted the power, grip, or rule of “the people.” Of course, it was not all of the people. Male Athenians registered as citizens in various demes constituted political stakeholders, while political privileges did not extend to women, slaves, and non-Greeks. However, “the people” was a fairly expansive concept, and one historian stresses that Athenian democracy implied the power of poor people. Thus at the beginning, democracy was a system where political participation was not determined by wealth or social status alone. Though the Athenians were essentially “equal” in the political sense — the Greek concept isonomia meaning exact equality before the law — they were less so in other ways, whether in property or even social standing. One of the lingering questions about ancient-versus-modern democracy, then, has to do with this very notion of equality. Political equality means, among other things, one man/one vote, and the equal application of the law. But modern concepts such as “social democracy” or “economic democracy” likely have in mind different versions of equality, be it a social safety net, education, or even something as specific as socialized healthcare. While these areas are political in some senses, they speak to broader material needs that were historically outside the purview of politics, and thus could be seen as non-political goods. But if the idea of democracy has become so broad in modern times that it can essentially mean anything, this casts certain confusions over those things done in the name of democracy. 


Another conceptual and terminological difference between ancient and modern democracy has to do with the geography of Athenian politics versus our own. In Athens citizens could vote directly because of their spatial proximity to one another, whereas the American Founders knew North America was far too vast for a federal, direct democracy. In Athens, direct democracy inculcated a certain accountability among the citizenry, as one’s vote was public, and their “politics” would be daily scrutinized by their peers. Contrast this with modern democracy where Americans, for example, vote secretly for representatives, who then vote publicly on national measures and policies (that is, if they choose to vote, and that’s also assuming they actually read the bill). The average American voter, however, is not necessarily accountable for their vote since fellow citizens may not even know their neighbor’s politics. This criticism of democracy — its lack of accountability — will become more clear in what follows, as we survey antidemocratic thought specifically in American history. But whether for or against democracy, it’s important to define our terms, to know what it is we support or oppose. Like most words, democracy has multiple definitions (sometimes contradictory at that), and its meaning and use has changed over time. We no longer necessarily define it as the power of poor people, and in terms of national politics America does not use direct democracy (cue the Electoral College). 


Murray Rothbard, the last of the “anti-democrats” discussed below, defined democracy this way: “A system of majority rule in which each citizen has one vote either in deciding the policies of the government or in electing the rulers, who will in turn decide policy” (Power & Market, 233). While simple enough, we might pay special attention to the word “majority rule,” as this concept has in some ways been the thorn in the flesh of democracy’s proponents. There is simply no way of getting around numbers. In a democracy, numbers win, and thus the system results in (or devolves into) what James Madison called “factions,” defined as political and social camps or rivalries. But long before Madison, Plato and Aristotle were wary of the combustible nature of democracy in their native Athens. Without a counterbalance, they believed democracy could result in anarchy and mob rule (okhlokratia). Demagogues — smooth-talking leaders of “the people” — would manipulate the system for their own personal gain, using numbers to their advantage. Perhaps this sounds familiar to modern ears. While Aristotle argued for a mixed political system that incorporated democracy as one constituent element, Plato was vehemently antidemocratic. Through the mouth of Socrates in The Republic Plato refers to democracy as “a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike” (The Republic, Book VIII). Thus Plato is a key figure in the history of antidemocratic thought, as he sketches what he believes to be its basic flaws: It’s often rooted in emotionalism, it caters to the lowest common denominator, and its search for equality is chimerical. (This is why my philosophy students often call Plato “a jerk.”)